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FETAL HOMICIDE: WOMAN OR FETUS AS VICTIM? A SUR-
VEY OF CURRENT STATE APPROACHES AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STATE APPLICATION
On June 7, 1998, Sabrina Adkinson was walking across Mer-
cury Boulevard in Hampton, Virginia.' At the time, she was
eight months pregnant with her seventh child, a daughter to be
named Destiny.' Traveling between sixty-five and sixty-eight
miles per hour in a forty-mile per hour zone, an apparently
-drunk driver plowed into, and killed, both Ms. Adkinson and the
fetus.' The driver had been convicted of driving under the influ-
ence (DUI) in 1996 and was charged with involuntary man-
slaughter in Ms. Adkinson's death.4 He could not be charged in
the death of the fetus because Virginia law does not allow sepa-
rate prosecutions for fetal homicides unless the fetus is first
born alive, nor does Virginia law provide increased penalties for
vehicular homicides involving pregnant women. 5
The Virginia General Assembly first considered a feticide bill
in the 1996 session6 and considered a similar measure in 1998. 7
The proposed 1996 bill provided that a fetus is a person for laws
related to murder.' The General Assembly eventually passed
legislation that increased penalties for murdering pregnant
women and amended the aggravated malicious wounding statute
to include miscarriage as a serious bodily injury.9 The proposed
1. See Kelli Caplan, Pregnant Woman, Fetus Die After Being Hit by Car: Driver
Charged with Drunken Driving, DAILY PRESS (Newport News, VA), June 9, 1998, at Al.
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See Kelli Caplan, Man Faces Charges in Death: Pregnant Woman Killed; Suspect's
2nd DUI Charge, DAILY PRESS (Newport News, VA), June 10, 1998, at C1. The defendant
pleaded guilty to aggravated involuntary manslaughter and was sentenced to eighteen
years in prison (four years suspended, leaving fourteen years to serve). See William H.
McMichael, Driver Will Serve Years for Death of Woman, DAILY PRESS (Newport News,
VA), Sept. 1, 1999, at C1. The trial judge noted that the defendant was on probation for
a previous DUI conviction at the time of the instant offense, and called Ms. Adkinson's
death "a very tragic, horrific case." Id.
5. See Caplan, supra note 4, at C1.
6. See S.B. 495, 1996 Reg. Sess. (Va.).
7. See S.B. 198, 1998 Reg. Sess. (Va.).
8. See Va. S.B. 495.
9. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-31(11), -32.1, -51.2 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999).
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1998 bill, sponsored by State Senator Forbes, from Chesapeake,
established the crime of feticide for the murder of an unborn
viable fetus, but the bill was not carried over to the next legisla-
tive session.1"
This Note explores the topic of fetal homicide statutes and
their application in Virginia and other states. The first section
provides an overview of the approaches taken by states on the
issue of fetal homicide statutes. The second section examines the
dimensions of fetal homicide laws, noting important trends
among the state statutes. Most significantly, the states tend to
diverge with respect to who is the victim protected in homicide
statutes: the fetus or the pregnant woman. The third section
suggests ways that states can take a balanced stance on the
issue of fetal homicide, regardless of which dominant approach
is chosen, and submits that the optimal strategy should focus on
the woman as the victim, thereby satisfying societal concerns
while avoiding the brunt of opposition by pro-choice advocates.
Finally, this Note proposes a Virginia statute that would penal-
ize persons who drive under the influence of alcohol and injure
pregnant women.
OVERVIEW OF APPROACHES TAKEN BY STATES
States take various approaches to punishing harm caused to
pregnant women. Generally, states can be divided into those
adopting a born alive rule, those punishing harm inflicted upon
a fetus, and those punishing harm to the woman. Each of these
approaches will be discussed in turn.
The Born Alive Rule
This subsection focuses on the born alive rule and the changes
to the rule adopted or considered by many states. The treatment
begins with a historical discussion of the born alive rule and
then surveys those states that subscribe to this rule.
10. See Va. S.B. 198.
11. See generally Allison Tsao, Note, Fetal Homicide Laws: Shield Against Domestic
Violence or Sword to Pierce Abortion Rights?, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457 (1998) (dis-
cussing various state approaches to fetal homicide statutes).
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The common law born alive rule originated in England, based
on the medical knowledge of the sixteenth century. 2 Under this
rule, live birth, regardless of the actual gestational age, was the
point at which life could be observed clinically."3 In cases of fetal
death, it was difficult to distinguish between death from natural
causes, or injuries inflicted in utero.'4 Determining if "material
acts" caused the death required the fetus to be born alive. 5 Sir
Edward Coke reflected the seventeenth-century common law
view that the homicide of an unborn fetus was not murder, but
some lesser crime, 6 which Sir William Blackstone reiterated in
the eighteenth century.17 The rule "is recognized to be an eviden-
tiary principle that was required by the state of medical science
of the day." 8 Jurisdictions in the United States adopted the born
alive rule, and several states maintain the rule either through
express statutes or court interpretation. 9
12. See Clarke D. Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn Child: The Born Alive Rule and
Other Legal Anachronisms, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 563, 571 (1987) (providing an excellent
reference for a detailed history of the born alive rule and its application in common law
and in American jurisdictions).
13. See id. at 568. Life may be observed clinically "'[wihenever the infant at or after
birth breathes spontaneously or shows any other sign of life such as heart beat or defi-
nite spontaneous movement of voluntary muscles .... ." Id. (quoting JACK PRITCHARD ET
AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 2 (17th ed. 1985)).
14. See id. at 575.
15. See id.
16.
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a Potion or otherwise killeth in her
wombe; or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dieth in her body, and she
is delivered of a dead childe, this is a great misprison, and no murder; but if
the childe be born alive; and dieth of the Potion, battery, or other cause, this
is murder for in law it is accounted a reasonable creature, in rerum natura,
when it is born alive.
Id. at 583 n.92 (quoting Sm EDWARD COKE, THE TmID PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 50 (photo. reprint 1986) (1797)).
17.
[I]f a woman is quick with child, and by a potion or otherwise, killeth it in
her womb; or if any one beat her, whereby the child dieth in her body, and
she is delivered of a dead child; this though not murder, was by the ancient
law homicide or manslaughter. But the modern law doth not look upon this
offence in quite so atrocious a light but merely as a heinous misdemeanor.
Stephanie Ritrivi McCavitt, The "Born Alive" Rule: A Proposed Change to the New York
Law Based on Modern Medical Technology, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 609, 612 (1991) (quot-
ing 1 WmAm BLACKSTONE, COmmENTARmS *129-*130).
18. Forsythe, supra note 12, at 586.
19. See id. at 596 n.161.
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The case most widely cited for a discussion of the born alive
rule is Keeler v. Superior Court."° In Keeler, the defendant
blocked his ex-wife's car on a narrow mountain road and forced
her out of the car.2 At the time his ex-wife was pregnant with a
viable fetus, later determined to have a seventy-five to ninety-
six percent chance of survival if born uninjured." The defendant
had warned her of the consequences if she were pregnant with
another man's child.23 After realizing that she was pregnant,2
the defendant threatened "'I'm going to stomp it out of you,'" and
then "pushed her against the car, shoved his knee into her abdo-
men, and struck her in the face."25 The woman survived, but the
fetus was stillborn and the defendant was charged with mur-
der.26 Writing for the majority, Justice Mosk discussed the history
of the born alive rule extensively and evaluated the legislature's
intent in enacting the state's murder statute. The majority
determined that the legislature "did not intend the act of feti-
cide-as distinguished from abortion-to be" a crime.28
Currently, a total of eighteen states still subscribe to the born
alive rule, either by express statutory language or through judi-
cial interpretation.29 In eight of these eighteen states, criminal
statutes explicitly define "person," "individual" or "human being"
as one who is born and alive.3 0 Eight other states have defini-
tions of "person" or "human being" in their statutes or refer to
20. 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970).
21. See id. at 618.
22. See id. at 619.
23. See id. at 618.
24. See id.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 619.
27. See id. at 619-22; see also Forsythe, supra note 12, at 603-04 (recounting Justice
Mosk's discussion in Keeler of the history behind the born alive rule).
28. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 622.
29. See infra notes 30-44 and accompanying text.
"30. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-1(2) (1994); ALAsKA STAT. § 11.41.140 (Michie 1998);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-101(2) (West 1999); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-700
(Michie 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(28) (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-302(2)
(Michie 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.005(3) (1990); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(26)
(West 1994). Additionally, Idaho and Maine define "person" as "human being" in their
statutes, but their state courts have been silent on the issue of whether "persons" or
"human beings" include fetuses. See IDAHO CODE §§ 18-101, 4001, 4006 (1997); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 2(20), 201 (West 1983).
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persons or human beings in their homicide statutes;3 1 their
courts have held explicitly that the definitions of these statutes
do not encompass fetuses.3 2
North Carolina considered application of the born alive rule in
State v. Beale. The grand jury indicted the defendant with the
murder of his wife and unborn child, 4 specifically charging that
he fired a "shotgun with intent to destroy the unborn child."3 5
31. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-3(l) (West 1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-
010 (Banks-Baldwin 1990); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27, § 407 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
2C:1-14, :11-2 (West 1995); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.00, 125.05 (Consol. 1998); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-17 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5301(4) (1998); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-1
(1997).
32. See Williams v. State, 550 A.2d 722 (Md. 1988) (sustaining the common law rule,
but also holding that homicide includes deaths of fetuses born alive, but injured before
birth); In re A.W.S., 440 A.2d 1144 (N.J. 1981) (holding that an unborn fetus was not a
person within the criminal homicide provision); People v. Vercelletto, 514 N.Y.S.2d 177
(1987) (holding that manslaughter in the second degree did not extend to an unborn
fetus injured in a car accident, although the court also held that a pregnant victim's loss
of a fetus was a "serious physical injury" for purposes of the second-degree vehicular
assault statute); People v. Joseph, 496 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1985) (holding that the homicide
statute did not include nonabortional homicides of viable fetuses); State v. Beale, 376
S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1989); State v. Oliver, 563 A.2d 1002 (Vt. 1989) (holding that a viable
fetus was not a person within the meaning of "person" in the state's death by motor
vehicle statute); State ex rel. Atkinson v. Wilson, 332 S.E.2d 807 (W. Va. 1984) (holding
that a viable unborn child was not a victim within the murder statute).
Kentucky sustained the born alive rule in 1983 in Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652
S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983). The defendant was indicted for murder after he told his wife he
did not want a baby, and forced his hand up her vagina intending to destroy the fetus.
See id. at 61. The defendant's actions killed the viable fetus. See id. at 61-62. The Su-
preme Court of Kentucky ultimately held that the fetus was not a person for purposes of
the murder statute. See id. at 62-65. See generally Perry Mack Bentley, Feticide: Murder
in Kentucky?, 71 KY. L.J. 933 (1982) (analyzing the court's decision and proposing a feti-
cide statute); Margaret A. Miller, Criminal Law-Murder-Intentional Killing of Viable
Fetus Not Murder, 11 N. KY. L. REV. 213 (1984) (analyzing the court's decision and the
born alive rule); Tracy A. Nelson, Taking Roe to the Limits: Treating Viable Feticide as
Murder, 17 IND. L. REV. 1119 (1984) (discussing the Hollis decision, the need to elimi-
nate the born alive rule, and proposing legislative reform).
33. 376 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1989). See generally Tony Hartsoe, Person or Thing-In Search
of the Legal Status of a Fetus: A Survey of North Carolina Law, 17 CAMPBELL L. REV.
169 (1995) (examining the legal status of a fetus under North Carolina law in the areas
of wrongful death, prenatal injury, criminal law, wrongful birth, and wrongful concep-
tion); Gary V. Perko, State v. Beale and the Killing of a Viable Fetus: An Exercise in
Statutory Construction and the Potential for Legislative Reform, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1144
(1990) (analyzing the court's decision and the born alive rule).
34. See Beale, 376 S.E.2d at 1.
35. 1d.
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The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the definition of
a victim under the murder statute did not include an unborn
viable fetus. 6 Despite the court's precedent recognizing a viable
fetus as a person within the state's wrongful death statute, 7 the
court distinguished the legislative actions and histories between
the wrongful death and murder statutes.38 The court relied upon
DiDonato v. Wortman,39 a case concerning the wrongful death of
a stillborn child, in which the court reasoned that, because the
state's statutes provided for tort claims by children to recover for
fetal injuries, the legislature would also want to allow recovery
for a viable fetus's death.40 The court in DiDonato held that the
term "person" in the wrongful death statute included a viable
fetus.41 In Beale, however, the court listed specific occasions in
which the legislature could have amended criminal statutes to
include fetuses as victims, but did not.42 The court strictly con-
strued the criminal statutes to exclude the fetus as a victim.'
Courts in Alabama, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, New
York, and Texas, though maintaining the born alive rule, have
held that if fetuses are injured before birth, are born alive, and
then die, their deaths can be prosecuted as homicides."
36. See id. at 4.
37. See id. at 2 (citing DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 1987)).
38. See id.
39. 358 S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 1987).
40. See id. at 491.
41. See id.
42. See Beale, 376 S.E.2d at 4.
43. See id.
44. See Clarkev. State, 23 So. 671 (Ala. 1898) (upholding the defendant's conviction for
second-degree murder of a fetus after the defendant beat the mother); Jones v. Common-
wealth, 830 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1992) (upholding a conviction for second-degree manslaughter
during the operation of a motor vehicle); Williams v. State, 550 A.2d 722 (Md. 1988)
(upholding a conviction for manslaughter by bow and arrow); State v. Anderson, 343 A-2d
505 (N.J. 1975) (upholding a conviction for the murder of twin fetuses); People v. Hall, 557
N.Y.S.2d 879 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (upholding a conviction for second-degree manslaugh-
ter); Cuellar v. State, 957 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (upholding a conviction for
intoxication manslaughter); see also McCavitt, supra note 17, at 609 (comparing New
York law with fetal homicide laws of other states and suggesting the state adopt similar
laws based on viability); Annissa R. Obasi, Note, Protecting Our Vital Organs: The Case for
Fetal Homicide Laws in Texas, 4 TE. WESLEYAN L. REV. 207 (1997-98) (supporting the
intermediate appellate court's decision in Cuellar v. State and recommending that Texas
formally adopt the limited revision of the born alive rule); Court Refuses to Hear Appeal in
CaseInvolvingFetus Death, SAN ANTONIo EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 23, 1998, atB2, available in
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States Criminalizing Actions Against Fetuses
In contrast to those maintaining the born alive rule, twenty-
four states criminalize actions against the fetus. This approach
recognizes the fetus as the victim of the aggressor's actions. As
will be seen, however, these states differ with respect to the
threshold at which criminal culpability attaches-some states
will punish the offender only if the harmed fetus has reached a
certain stage of development. This section surveys the states ac-
cording to fetal gestational age.
Viability
Modern medical jurisprudence refers to "viability" as an im-
portant stage in fetal development.45 The Supreme Court defined
viability in Roe v. Wade 6 as that period at the end of the second
trimester of pregnancy when the fetus is capable of surviving
outside the womb." The Court determined that when balanced
against a woman's right to privacy, a fetus was not a "person"
with rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 States, however,
have an interest in protecting "potential life" when the fetus
reaches viability, usually at twenty-eight weeks of pregnancy,
but theoretically as early as twenty-four weeks. 49 The Court in
Roe limited its discussion to actions taken by the mother and
her physicians, not actions taken by a third party to terminate
the pregnancy without the woman's consent.50
Six states criminalize homicides of viable fetuses by statute or
judicial interpretation.5 1 Three of these states protect fetuses
1998 WL 5088854 (describing the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' refusal to hear an
appeal of an intoxication manslaughter case).
45. See Forsythe, supra note 12, at 569.
46. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
47. See id. at 162-64.
48. See id. at 155-59.
49. See id. at 162-64.
50. See id. at 163-65.
51. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-42-1-1(4), -42-1-6 (Lexis 1998 & Supp. 1999); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 1 (West 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.322 (West
1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 105, 711 (West 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (Law
Co-op. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-214 (1997).
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with homicide statutes.52 For example, Indiana originally enacted
52. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-42-1-1(4), -42-1-6; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.322;
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-214.
The Michigan statute provides penalties for the manslaughter or willful killing of an
"unborn quick child," see MICH. COmp. LAWS ANN. § 750.322, but curiously the state's
supreme court has held that the word "child" in this statute and the abortion statutes
refer to a viable child. See Larkin v. Cahalan, 208 N.W.2d 176 (Mich. 1973). Larkin de-
fines a child as:
A viable child in the womb of its mother; that is, an unborn child whose
heart is beating, who is experiencing electronically measurable brain waves,
who is discernibly moving, and who is so far developed and matured as to be
capable of surviving the trauma of birth with the aid of the usual medical
care and facilities available in the community.
Id. at 180.
In 1980, however, the Michigan Court of Appeals decided that the state's vehicular
homicide statute did not include viable fetuses as victims. See People v. Guthrie, 293
N.W.2d 775 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980). Subsequently, the legislature considered a bill that
would provide penalties for harming a fetus, with a possible penalty of life in prison for
"intentionally causing a miscarriage or stillbirth." Karen Schulz & Ed Golder, Bill Gives
Rights to Unborn Fetuses; Some Fear the Legislation, Which Gov. Engler Is Expected to
Sign, Is a Step Toward Ending a Woman's Right to Choose Abortion, GRAND RAPIDS
PRESS, June 14, 1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL 12600004. An opponent responded
that "[ult doesn't overtly say fetuses are people.... But in a backhanded fashion, it cre-
ates a situation where an embryo or a fetus is a person." Id. The bill did not become law.
See generally Mark S. Kende, Michigan's Proposed Prenatal Protection Act: Undermining
a Woman's Right to an Abortion, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 247 (1996) (examining Senate
Bill 515, introduced in the 1995 session of the Michigan Legislature, and its alternative).
Tennessee originally subscribed to the born alive rule. See Forsythe, supra note 12, at
596 n.161. For example, in State v. Evans, 745 S.W.2d 880 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987), the
court held that a viable fetus was not a person within the state's vehicular homicide
statute. See id. at 882. In Evans, the defendant collided with another vehicle while driv-
ing drunk, killing the pregnant passenger's fetus, which was in its eighth month of de-
velopment. See id. at 880. The court noted that the same state senator sponsored both
the state's wrongful death statute and vehicular homicide statute, and that the legisla-
ture passed both measures during a single legislative session. See id. at 882. The court
reasoned that the legislature intended that viable fetuses not be included in the homicide
statute because the wrongful death statute included viable fetuses as victims, while the
vehicular homicide statute did not. See id.
Two years after Evans, the Tennessee legislature expanded the definition of "another"
and "another person" to include a viable fetus as a victim of homicides and assaults. See
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-214. The state demonstrated its resolve to apply the newly ex-
panded law by prosecuting a drunk driver who was sentenced to two six-year prison
terms for the vehicular homicide deaths of a pregnant woman and her eight-month fetus
in the first conviction under the new law. See Bob Fowler, Man Petitions Court for Relief
from Vehicular Homicide Terms; Moore Has Been Denied Parole at 3 Hearings, KNOX-
VILLE NEws-SENTINEL, Apr. 18, 1994, at BC1, available in 1994 WL 7916394. A year
later, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals went one step further and upheld the
defendant's conviction of vehicular homicide in State v. Williamson, 919 S.W.2d 69 (Tenn.
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a "feticide" statute that criminalized knowing or intentional
termination of another's pregnancy, with exceptions for abortion,
and mandated a maximum eight-year penalty.53 In Baird v.
State,' the Supreme Court of Indiana held that the legislature
intended this statute to punish those who "knowingly terminat-
ed a human pregnancy," even without the specific intent to kill
the fetus.5 Despite the defendant's argument that the statutory
language required a specific intent to kill the fetus, the court
reasoned that the language was used specifically to exempt from
prosecution two intentional actions by physicians.56 Yielding to
popular support for a more effective feticide law,5" the Indiana
legislature, over the governor's veto, enacted sweeping legisla-
tion criminalizing acts against pregnant women and fetuses.5"
The most significant provision of these new laws established
murder of a pregnant woman that results in the intentional
death of a viable fetus as an aggravating circumstance for a
death sentence or life imprisonment without parole.59 The Indi-
ana law also includes penalties for crimes against viable fetuses
and pregnant women ranging from murder to aggravated bat-
tery.60
Crim. App. 1995). In Williamson, the defendant was a vehicle owner who let a friend
drive while intoxicated. The intoxicated driver subsequently collided with another car
killing herself and the other car's occupant, a pregnant woman carrying a fetus in its
thirty-eighth week of gestation. See id. at 73. The Williamson case became "one of the
first in Tennessee to hold the owner of a car-not just the driver-responsible for the
death of a fetus in a traffic accident." Gina Farn, Car Owner Jailed for DUI Deaths,
NASHVILLE BANNER, Dec. 22, 1995, at A12, available in 1995 WL 1278764.
53. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-42-1-6, -50-2-5.
54. 604 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1992).
55. Id. at 1190.
56. See id. at 1189-90.
57. See Jennifer E. Smith, Grieving Families Seek Law Change, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
June 28, 1995, at E01, available in 1995 WL 3069616 (reporting the case of an Indiana
couple who criticized the low penalties in the state's feticide law after they had been shot
and injured as they sat on their porch, killing her eight-month-old fetus).
58. See Editorial, A Vote for the Unborn's Worth, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 24, 1998,
at A8, available in 1998 WL 8306412 (reporting the governor's concern that physicians
could be prosecuted for late-term abortions, even though the legislation exempted legal
abortions).
59. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9.
60. See id. § 35-42-1-1 (murder); id. § 35-42-1-3 (voluntary manslaughter); id. § 35-42-
1-4 (involuntary manslaughter); id. § 35-42-2-1.5 (aggravated battery).
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In the remaining three states that recognize viability as the
threshold for criminal culpability, the courts, as opposed to the
legislatures, have taken the lead. Although their statutes are
silent on the meaning of "person" for the purposes of homicide,6
the courts of Massachusetts,62 South Carolina,63 and Oklahoma'
have held that viable fetuses are indeed persons under these
61. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 1 (West 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§
105, 711 (West 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (Law Co-op. 1976).
62. Massachusetts first addressed the question of a viable fetus as a victim of homi-
cide in Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984), and later applied the
same standard in a different setting in Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 536 N.E.2d 571
(Mass. 1989). In Cass, the defendant struck a female pedestrian while operating an auto-
mobile. See Cass, 467 N.E.2d at 1325. The collision killed the victim's eight-and-one-half-
month-old fetus and resulted in the driver's prosecution for violating the vehicular homi-
cide statute. See id. Although it applied the rule prospectively, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held that the legislature contemplated that the term "person"
would be construed to include viable fetuses in the homicide statutes. See id. See generally
Roselee Price, Commonwealth v. Cass: Criminal Liability for the Death of a Viable Fetus-
Under the Massachusetts Vehicular Homicide Statute, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV. 147 (1985)
(analyzing the court's rejection of the born alive rule).
In Lawrence, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder of a sixteen-year-
old girl and involuntary manslaughter of her viable fetus. See Lawrence, 536 N.E.2d at
573. As it had in Cass, the high court held that a viable fetus could also be considered a
"person" in the common law crime of homicide. See id. Subsequently, a man was convicted
of two counts of involuntary manslaughter for shooting and killing his girlfriend and her
viable fetus. See Dorchester Man Convicted in Death of Woman, Fetus, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 19, 1991, available in 1991 WL 7410428. The supreme court upheld the conviction,
see Commonwealth v. Crawford, 629 N.E.2d 1332 (Mass. 1994), and the superior court
later rejected the defendant's contention that the two convictions and consecutive sen-
tences violated double jeopardy. See Commonwealth v. Crawford, No. CRIM. A. 089011-
12, 1997 WIL 184429 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1997), affd 722 N.E.2d 960 (Mass. 2000).
63. See infra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
64. Oklahoma cases follow the approaches taken in Massachusetts and South Carolina.
For example, in Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994), the court con-
sidered the case of a defendant who, while intoxicated, drove her vehicle into oncoming
traffic and collided with another vehicle. See Hughes, 868 P.2d at 731. The driver of the
other vehicle was nine months pregnant and due to deliver in four days. See id. An emer-
gency caesarian section was performed, but the fetus was stillborn. See id. The Oklaho-
ma Court of Criminal Appeals, agreeing with the courts in Cass and Home, expressly
rejected the born alive rule and held that a viable fetus could be the victim of a homi-
cide. See id. The court, however, decided to apply the rule prospectively and reversed the
manslaughter conviction. See id. at 704. The court observed that its decision was consis-
tent with its decision in Hooks v. State, 862 P.2d 1273 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993), in which
it upheld the defendant's conviction under a manslaughter statute. See id.; see also
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 713 (West 1983). The court made it clear that the new status
of the fetus under the criminal law would not affect abortion. See Hughes, 868 P.2d at
734-35.
FETAL HOMICIDE
laws. The situation in South Carolina is illustrative. South Caro-
lina abrogated the born alive rule in 1984 in State v. Home.65 In
Home, the defendant was convicted of assault and battery with
intent to kill and involuntary manslaughter.6" Home had
stabbed his estranged wife, who survived, but her full-term via-
ble fetus died.67 The court determined that the fetus was the vic-
tim of the defendant's transferred intent toward the mother and
held that a viable fetus was a "person" within the state's statu-
tory definition of murder.68
In State v. Ard,69 the Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld
a defendant's death sentence for the murders of his girlfriend
and their viable unborn son.70 The Ard court ruled that a viable
fetus is a "person" or "child" in terms of statutory aggravating
circumstances, making the defendant eligible for the death pen-
alty.' The court recognized that when the legislature added the
appropriate aggravating circumstance to the murder statute, it
was aware of the court's decision in Home and could have decided
to exempt fetuses from the definition.72 South Carolina thus
became the first state to "allow the death penalty for someone
convicted of murdering a viable fetus."' The state's attorney
general emphasized that the decision "does not mean doctors
who illegally perform third-trimester abortions can be sent to
Death Row."74
Quickening
Quickening is the period prior to viability when the mother
first feels the fetus move in the womb, normally between the six-
teenth and eighteenth week of pregnancy.75 At common law, this
65. 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984).
66. See id.
67. See id. at 704.
68. See id.
69. 505 S.E.2d 328 (S.C. 1998).
70. See id. at 331.
71. See id. at 330.
72. See id. at 331.
73. Death Penalty Upheld for Killing Viable Fetus, POST & COURIER (Charleston, SC),
Sept. 17, 1998, at B6, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCNEWS File.
74. Id. (quoting South Carolina Attorney General Charlie Condon).
75. See Forsythe, supra note 12, at 567.
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was the period when the fetus was first considered alive. 6 In
Roe v. Wade, 7 Justice Blackmun described quickening as the
"confluence of earlier philosophical, theological, and civil and
canon law concepts of when life begins."78 Since the advent of
modern medical techniques, quickening has "little medical or
legal significance in understanding pregnancy."7 9 At common
law, killing a "quickened" fetus was homicide, but not murder.80
Six states criminalize actions against "quick" fetuses. Florida,
Mississippi, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Washington all punish
willfully or intentionally and unlawfully killing an unborn quick
child as manslaughter;8 Georgia punishes such an action as feti-
cide.82 The states vary with respect to punishment.83 The courts
in these states have applied these statutes on numerous occasions.
76. See id. at 568.
77. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
78. Id. at 133.
79. Forsythe, supra note 12, at 567.
80. See McCavitt, supra note 17, at 612.
81. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (1998);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.210 (Michie 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5 (1994); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999).
82. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (1999).
83. Georgia and Washington have maximum sentences of life imprisonment. See GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060 (West Supp. 1999); id. §
9A.20.021 (West 1988). Florida's punishment is a term not greater than 15 years,
Mississippi's sentence is 2 to 20 years, and Rhode Island's punishment is a term not
greater than 30 years. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082(3)(c) (West 1992 & Supp. 1999);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-25; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-3. Georgia extends criminal liability
further by providing penalties for feticide by vehicle. See GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-393.1
(1997).
84. See, e.g., Brinkley v. State, 322 S.E.2d 49 (Ga. 1984) (holding that the description
"quick" in the state's feticide statute was not unconstitutionally vague and noting that
the term had been used in criminal provisions in English law since 1803); State v. Willis,
457 So. 2d 959, 960 (Miss. 1984) (holding, in a case of first impression, that man-
slaughter of a fetus did not merge with the charge of murder of the mother, and the de-
fendant could be charged with murder in the mother's death and manslaughter in the
fetus's death); State v. Amaro, 448 A.2d 1257, 1259-60 (R.I. 1982) (holding that the
state's homicide statute did not apply to fetuses in light of the state feticide statute that
specifically punished the "wilful killing of an unborn quick child"). Compare Anne Koch
et al., Killer's Life Influenced Jurors: BlackwellAvoids Death Penalty; Jury Splits Decision,
SEATTLE TIMES, June 19, 1996, at B1, available in 1996 WL 3668913 (describing a brutal
killing for which the defendant was convicted of three counts of aggravated first-degree
murder and fetal manslaughter, and was sentenced to life imprisonment without the pos-
sibility of parole), with Julie Emery, Six-Month Sentence for Driver of Car that Killed
Unborn Baby, SEATrLE TIMES, Dec. 10, 1987, at Ell, available in 1987 WL 5386126 (de-
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Florida provides a useful example of how a state's criminal
law protecting fetuses can develop in the context of the abortion
debate. Typically, Florida rarely prosecuted violations of the
state's fetal manslaughter statute.8 5 In a notable case, however,
a defendant who stabbed his ex-wife was charged with fetal
manslaughter, along with first-degree murder."6 The case at-
tracted a great deal of attention from both sides of the abortion
debate.8 7 The jury ultimately convicted the defendant for man-
slaughter of the woman, but the court dismissed the manslaugh-
ter charge for the fetus.8 The judge said that according to the
100-year-old statute, the defendant "could be convicted of man-
slaughter in the death of the fetus only if he had been found
guilty of murdering" the woman, rather than for the lesser
charge of manslaughter.8 9
Recently, Florida enacted a vehicular homicide law that
makes it a crime to kill a viable fetus in a car accident.90 Florida
enacted this law in reaction to intense lobbying on behalf of a
woman whose daughter and grandson were killed in a car acci-
dent along with the daughter's unborn child.91 The original bill,
first proposed in 1997, was caught up in controversy between
pro-choice and antiabortion forces.92 One pro-choice lobbyist,
however, said that although she opposed permitting separate
scribing a case in which the defendant was convicted of vehicular assault, rather than
vehicular homicide, because the applicable statute did not apply to fetuses as victims).
85. See Henry Pierson Curtis, When Fetus Died, Trial Got Complicated; An Orlando
Baker Is Charged with Killing His Ex-Wife, Who Was 6 Months Pregnant, ORLANDO SEN-
TINEL, Aug. 25, 1991, at BI, available in LEXIS, News Library, Orsent File.
86. See id.
87. See id. (noting that both abortion supporters and opponents believed a conviction
could affect the right to abortion).
88. See Purvette A. Bryant, Fetus Slaying Charge Dropped However, Michael Garner
Faces Up to 30 Years in Prison for Killing His Pregnant Ex-Wife, Angelica, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Oct. 30, 1997, at D1, available in 1997 WL 13302070.
89. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West 1992) ("The willful killing of an un-
born quick child, by any injury to the mother of such child which would be murder if it
resulted in the death of such mother....").
90. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.071 (West Supp. 1999).
91. See Mary Lou Pickel, Gardens Woman's Crusade Wins in Legislature, PALM
BEACH POST, May 2, 1988, at 3B, available in LEXJS, News Library, Pbpst File.
92. See Dina Nelson, Bill to Punish Motorists Who Kill Fetuses Caught in Abortion
Debate, PALM BEACH POST, Apr. 25, 1997, at 6B, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Pbpst File.
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convictions for killing a fetus, she could support increased penal-
ties for those who kill pregnant women and their fetuses.93 The
bill's sponsor, an abortion opponent, claimed that "[tihis has no-
thing-repeat nothing-to do with abortion."94 He then changed
the proposed legislation to restrict prosecutions to those involv-
ing viable fetuses, and the legislature passed the revised ver-
sion.95 The new law has been criticized because it could lead to
conflicts in future cases regarding the issue of whether the af-
fected fetus was viable.96
Twelve Weeks of Fetal Development
Arkansas recently established the culpability threshold at
twelve weeks of development. Arkansas originally subscribed to
the born alive rule, reinforcing this rule in Meadows v. State.97
In Meadows, the defendant drove recklessly while intoxicated
and struck an oncoming car.98 The driver of the other car was
killed, along with the viable fetus of a passenger in the
defendant's car, and the defendant was convicted of two counts
of manslaughter.9 The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the
fetus was not a "person" for purposes of the manslaughter stat-
ute.'00 The court determined that such a decision should be
made by the legislature; to do otherwise would create a new
common law crime.'01
Later in 1987, the Arkansas legislature responded to Meadows
by enacting a statute enlarging the crime of battery to include
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. See Pickel, supra note 91, at 3B.
96. See Unfathomable Grief, Inappropriate Laws, PALM BEACH POST, June 7, 1998, at
2E, available in LEXIS, News Library, Pbpst File.
97. 722 S.W.2d 584 (Ark. 1987).
98. See id. at 585.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 587; see also ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1-102(13), -10-104 (Michie 1997).
See generally John T. Shannon, Note, A Fetus Is not a 'Person" as the Term Is Used in
the Manslaughter Statute: Meadows v. State, 10 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 403 (1987-88)
(analyzing the court's decision and the born alive rule).
101. See Meadows, 722 S.W.2d at 587.
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injuries to pregnant women resulting in miscarriage.0 2 The
resulting sentence may not be less than five years or more than
twenty years.1 0 3 As a further reaction to the Meadows decision,
the Arkansas legislature recently enacted a comprehensive fetal
protection act and amended the Arkansas Code to expand the
definition of "person" to include fetuses at twelve weeks of devel-
opment."4 Accordingly, Arkansas is unique because it has laws
protecting both women and fetuses.
Seven to Eight Weeks of Fetal Development
California also draws a unique line in determining what fetal
crimes are punishable under its criminal law. Although
California's murder statute extends protection to the unborn, the
law does not specify the applicable stage of development.0 5 In
the landmark case of People v. Davis, °6 the California Supreme
Court determined that fetal viability was not an element of fetal
murder, but established seven to eight weeks of development as
the threshold for criminal culpability.' In Davis, the defendant
102. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-201(5). An article in The Arkansas Gazette explained
that the prior "[e]xisting law makes it impossible to file a criminal charge, for example,
when a drunk driver causes the death of a fetus in a wreck." Legislative Calendar, ARK.
GAZETrE, Feb. 25, 1987, at 9A, available in 1987 WL 5677861.
103. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-401 (providing a sentence of not less than 5
years or more than 20 years for battery), with VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18-2.51.2, -10 (Michie
1996 & Supp. 1999) (providing a sentence of 20 years to life for aggravated malicious
wounding).
104. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102(13)(B) (Supp. 1999); see also James Jefferson,
Senate OKs Measure to Protect the Unborn, A.P. NEWSWIRES, Apr. 7, 1999, available in
WESTLAW, APWIRES Database (describing efforts to pass the Arkansas legislation).
Four defendants recently were charged with capital murder in the state's first test of the
fetal homicide laws. See Kristin Everett, Innocent Pleas Entered to Murder Charges in
Death of Fetus, A.P. NEWSWIRES, Sept. 3, 1999, available in WESTLAW, ARNEWS Data-
base. One defendant has been accused of offering to pay the other three defendants to
beat up his girlfriend who was nine-months pregnant. See id. The beating killed the fe-
tus. See id.
105. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1999).
106. 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994).
107. See id. at 591. See generally Julie N. Qureshi, Note, People v. Davis: California's
Murder Statute and the Requirement of Viability for Fetal Murder, 25 GOLDEN GATE U.
L. REV. 579 (1995) (analyzing the court's decision and suggesting that California enact
separate feticide legislation).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1845
shot a pregnant woman in the course of a robbery.1 08 The woman
survived, but her nonviable fetus died.' °9 The court's opinion
reviewed the legislative history of the state's murder statute,
110
noting that the legislature had amended the law to include fe-
tuses in response to a supreme court holding"' that a fetus was
not a "human being" for purposes of the murder statute." The
Davis court held that viability is not a requirement for fetal
murder "as long as the state can show that the fetus has pro-
gressed beyond the embryonic stage of seven to eight weeks.""
The court, however, also decided that the decision would apply
prospectively." 4
Reaction to Davis was widespread." 5 Abortion rights activists
claimed that the decision "moved the law in a 'very troubling
direction.""' 6 Since the Davis ruling, there have been several
convictions under the fetal murder statute, with fetal develop-
ments ranging from fifteen weeks to eight months." 7 The Cali-
fornia courts, however, have limited the application of fetal ho-
108. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 592.
109. See id.
110. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187; Davis, 872 P.2d at 594-96.
111. See Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970).
112. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 607 (discussing the California legislature's reaction to
Keeler).
113. Id. at 602.
114. See id. at 600. Justice Mosk, the sole dissenting judge, vigorously disagreed with
the majority's view and believed the legislature intended to limit the murder statute's
application to the murder of a viable fetus. See id. at 607 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
115. See, e.g., Maura Dolan, Assault Causing Miscarriage Can Be Murder Case, L.
TIMES, May 17, 1994, at 1, available in 1994 WL 2166085.
116. Id. (quoting Abby Leibmen, executive director of California Woman's Law Cen-
ter).
117. See Jim Mikles, Drunk Driver Who Killed Fetus Gets 21 Years to Life, SAcRA-
MENTO BEE, May 19, 1995, at B1, available in 1995 WL 4119840 (reporting the case of a
woman convicted of second-degree murder in the death of an eight-month-old fetus in a
drunken driving accident where the driver was driving on a suspended license and pre-
viously had been convicted eight times of drunken driving); Tim O'Leary, 27 Years in
Death of Fetus. Temecula Man Sentenced for Beating Family Members Including His
Pregnant Wife Who Miscarried, PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Riverside, CA), May 8, 1998, at B1,
available in 1998 WL 12001057 (reporting the defendant's second-degree murder con-
viction for beating his wife, causing a miscarriage in the final weeks of her pregnancy);
Teen Sentenced in Fetus Slaying; Fresnan Convicted in Shooting that Led to the Death of
15-Week-Old Fetus, FRESNO BEE, July 15, 1995, at B3, available in 1995 WL 7419741 (re-
porting the defendant's second-degree murder conviction and sentence of twenty years to
life in prison for shooting and killing his ex-girlfriend's fifteen-week-old fetus).
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micide measures to charges of murder."1 In 1998, the California
Supreme Court upheld the first-degree murder and second-
degree fetal murder convictions of a defendant who had asked
for an instruction on fetal manslaughter and was refused." 9 The
court held that the crime of fetal manslaughter does not exist in
California.120
Fertilization or Conception
The last stage of fetal development that states have used as
the basis for criminalizing actions against fetuses is fertilization
or conception."2 Seven states penalize harm inflicted upon the
unborn at fertilization or conception: Missouri, 122 Pennsylva-
118. See People v. Brown, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155 (Ct. App. 1995).
119. See People v. Dennis, 950 P.2d 1035 (Cal.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 912 (1998).
120. See id. at 1058. The court also held that the second-degree murder conviction,
along with first-degree conviction in the mother's death, made the defendant eligible for
the death penalty under the state's multiple-murder special circumstance. See id. at
1059-60.
121. Most medical authorities equate the two terms. See Forsythe, supra note 12, at
620 n.338.
122. Courts in Missouri have interpreted their statutes to include the fetus as a vic-
tim for specified crimes. See State v. Knapp, 843 S.W.2d 345, 346 (Mo. 1992); State v.
Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286, 290-91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). The Missouri statute specifies
that the term "unborn child" includes human offspring from the moment of conception
until birth. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205.3 (West 1969 & Supp. 1999). The Missouri Su-
preme Court held that this definition applied to both the state's involuntary manslaugh-
ter statute and first-degree murder statute. See Knapp, 843 S.W.2d at 346 (Mo. 1992). In
Knapp, the defendant drove across the highway center line while intoxicated and collided
with a car driven by a woman who was six-months pregnant. See id. at 346. The mother
survived, but the viable fetus died prior to birth from injuries sustained in the accident.
See id. The court determined that the definition in section 1.205.3 applied to the involun-
tary manslaughter statute. See id. at 349; see also Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.024 (West
1999). The court noted that the legislature passed both statutes on the same day and
that the statutes must be read together. See Knapp, 843 S.W.2d at 347.
In State v. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997), the defendant was found
guilty of murdering his girlfriend and her unborn fetus. See id. at 288. The court, consis-
tent with Knapp, held that an unborn child was a "person" for the purposes of the first-
degree murder statute. See id. at 290; see also Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.020 (West 1999).
The court distinguished between the mother's right to obtain an abortion and the killing
of the fetus by a third party without the mother's consent. See Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d at
291. The defendant contended that his actions were equivalent to an illegal abortion and
should have been prosecuted as such (with a less severe penalty), rather than as first-
degree murder. The court reviewed the point, despite the defendant's failure to preserve
it for appeal, and concluded that criminal abortion laws "assume the actual or apparent
consent of the mother." Id. at 292. The court indicated that its result was consistent with
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nia,' Louisiana," North Dakota, 25 Illinois,'26 Minnesota, 1 7 and
those reached by courts in other states. See id.
123. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2601-2609 (West 1998). In 1997, Pennsylvania
passed the chapter, "Crimes Against Unborn Child," which established penalties for mur-
der, manslaughter, and assault. See id The statute's expansive definition of "unborn
child," which includes fetuses at any stage of development, see id. § 3203 (West 1983),
created great controversy. See, e.g., Bill to Punish Fetal Homicide Poorly Done, ALLEN-
TOWN MORNING CALL, Sept. 28, 1997, at A26, available in 1997 WL 11127446. Pro-choice
activists were concerned that defining the "unborn child" separately from the mother
created an artificial conflict between mother and fetus, and the Pennsylvania Coalition
Against Domestic Violence disagreed with the law's focus on the fetus instead of the
mother. See Pennsylvania: Feticide Bill Close to Becoming Law, ABORTION REP., Aug. 8,
1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wire Service Stories File.
124. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:2, 32.5 (West 1997). This feticide statute specifies
three degrees of feticide that are comparable to murder, manslaughter, and criminally
negligent homicide, including those inflicted by vehicle. See id. §§ 14:32.5 to .8. The fetus
is protected from the point of fertilization until birth. See id. § 14:2. In State v. Smith,
676 So. 2d 1068 (La. 1996), the Supreme Court of Louisiana upheld the statute. See id.
(holding that the defendant's convictions for manslaughter and feticide did not violate
double jeopardy in the strangulation death of his girlfriend and the subsequent death of
her fetus); see also Jarvis DeBerry, Slidell Man Denied Driver's License, Fetus Was Killed
in DWI Crash, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 28, 1999, at B1, available in 1999
WL 4390991 (describing a feticide conviction of a defendant who, while driving intoxicated,
crossed the highway center line and slammed head-on into a pickup truck carrying a
couple on the way to the hospital for their unborn child's birth; the unborn child was
killed in the accident).
125. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-17.1-01 to -06 (1997). North Dakota's statutes
include a chapter entitled "Offenses Against Unborn Children," with offenses ranging
from murder to assault. See id. §§ 12.1-17.1-01 to -07. The statute protects the fetus from
conception to birth. See id. § 12.1-17.1-01.
126. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2 (West 1993). Illinois enacted its feticide
legislation in response to the state supreme court's ruling in People v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d
203 (Ill. 1980) (upholding the born alive rule). The initial feticide statute contained a
viability requirement. See People v. Ford, 581 N.E.2d 1189, 1200 (III. App. Ct. 1991). In
1986, the legislature repealed the 1981 statute and enacted laws specifying several in-
tentional crimes against "unborn children." 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1.2, -2.1, -3.2, 5/12-
3.1, -4.4 (applying to the fetus at any stage of development); see also Bruce Kirkham,
State Senate OKs Bill Making Harm to Fetus a Crime, CI. SUN-TIMES, May 14, 1986, at
12, available in 1986 WL 3795970 (stating that the proposed offenses would range from
homicide to battery). Subsequent cases have upheld both the validity of the statute and
its penalties. See People v. Shoultz, 682 N.E.2d 446 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that the
penalties under the feticide statute were not disproportionate when compared to penal-
ties for illegal abortion); Ford, 581 N.E.2d at 1201 (holding that the statute was consti-
tutional even though it did not distinguish between viable and nonviable fetuses).




As Minnesota illustrates, a state's fetal homicide legislation
often develops in response to a high profile incident or a contro-
versial court decision. In 1985, the Supreme Court of Minnesota
held in State v. Soto" that an unborn viable fetus was not a
"human being" for the purposes of the state's vehicular homicide
statute.' In Soto, the defendant struck another car while driv-
ing intoxicated, resulting in the death of an eight-month-old fe-
tus. 13  The court emphasized that only the legislature had the
power to expand the statute to include fetuses.3 2 In response to
strong public sentiment in the wake of this decision,133 the state
legislature enacted a chapter entitled "Crimes Against Unborn
Children," which criminalized several forms of fetal violence,
including murder, manslaughter, injury or death in the commis-
sion of a crime, vehicular homicide, and assault."M These stat-
128. See 1998 Wis. Legis. Serv. 295 (West). In 1998, Wisconsin enacted fetal homi-
cide legislation in response to a jury's refusal to convict a man of killing a fetus under a
criminal abortion statute. See id.; Richard P. Jones & Mike Johnson, Cocaine Mom, Feti-
cide Bills Ok'd, Debate Turns Emotional Over Measures Aimed at Protecting Fetuses,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 2, 1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 6320568; see also WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 940.04(2)(a) (West 1996) (defining abortion as "[i]ntentionally destroying]
the life of an unborn quick child"). The Wisconsin Supreme Court, upon certification from
the trial court, had held that the defendant could be charged under the criminal abortion
statute and remanded the case for trial. See State v. Black, 526 N.W.2d 132, 133 (Wis.
1994). At trial, however, the prosecution could not prove the requisite intent, and the
jury acquitted. See Jones & Johnson, supra, at 1. The new statute dispenses with the re-
quirement of intent for many offenses. See Alan J. Borsuk, Wisconsin Law Makes Injur-
ing Fetus a Criminal Act, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, June 18, 1998, at 17A, available in 1998
WL 4140874.
129. 378 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1985).
130. See id. at 629.
131. See id. at 626.
132. See id. at 630. The court noted that Minnesota is a "code" state as opposed to a
"common law" state. See id. at 627; cf supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing three "common law" states, Massachusetts, South Carolina, and Oklahoma, and their
state courts' decisions to read their statutes expansively in the absence of legislative
direction).
133. See Lawmakers React to Ruling on Fetus, CH. TRIB., Dec. 8, 1985, at 20, avail-
able in 1985 WL 2566887 (noting predictions that abortion would be an issue in a re-
newed legislative debate); Minnesota Court Rules Unborn Child Not Person, Cmu. TRIB.,
Dec. 6, 1985, at 24, available in 1985 WL 2566369 (discussing the Minnesota Supreme
Court ruling that prompted legislative action).
134. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.266, .2661-.2665, .267-.2672, .268, 609.21 (West
1987 & Supp. 1999).
20001 1863
1864 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1845
utes subsequently withstood equal protection and vagueness
challenges in the courts.'35
Statutes with No Specified Gestational Age
Finally, of the states that criminalize harmful actions against
a fetus, three do not specify a threshold stage of fetal gestation:
Arizona,'36 South Dakota,117 and Utah.138 For example, Arizona's
135. See, e.g., State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 322-24 (Minn. 1990). In Merrill, the
defendant was charged in the shooting death of his girlfriend and her twenty-eight-day-
old embryo. See id. at 320. The decision was controversial because it was unclear wheth-
er the defendant knew that the woman was pregnant, because of the embryo's early ges-
tational age, and because the statute did not distinguish between viable and nonviable
fetuses. See id. at 321; Donna Halvorsen, Court Upholds State Fetal Death Laws, Leaves
Questions on When Life Begins, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, MN), Jan. 19, 1990, at A,
available in 1990 WL 5390274. The defendant based his equal protection claim on the
fact that he stood to be punished for actions that, if taken by a person aborting a nonvia-
ble fetus, would not result in punishment. See Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 321. The court
found the disparity to be valid, reasoning that one who terminates a woman's pregnancy
without her consent is not similarly situated with a woman who elects to have a legal
abortion. See id. at 321-22. The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the
statute was void for vagueness because it "faill[ed] to give fair warning to a potential
violator," particularly when neither the violator nor the pregnant woman knows about
the pregnancy. Id. at 323.
The reaction to the Merrill decision was mixed. Abortion opponents were pleased with
the court's decision upholding crimes against the fetus. See Donna Halvorsen, Both Sides
Find Reason to Like Ruling on Fetal Homicide Law, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, MN), Jan.
20, 1990, at 4B, available in 1990 WL 5390139. Conversely, abortion rights activists ap-
preciated the court's distinction between abortion and the actions of third parties who
kill fetuses without the mother's consent, although the activists were still concerned
about the state considering fetuses as persons. See id. The U.S. Supreme Court denied
certiorari, see Merrill v. Minnesota, 496 U.S. 931 (1990), and the defendant ultimately
pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree murder. See Jill Hodges, Fetus Law Chal-
lenge Fails; Murder Trial Can Proceed, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, MN), June 12, 1990, at
1B, available in 1990 WL 5386310; Man Says He Killed Woman, Embryo, STAR. TRIB.
(Minneapolis, MN), Sept. 15, 1990, at 4B, available in 1990 WL 5344690.
136. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
137. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-1-2(50A), -16-1, -1.1 (Michie 1998). South Dakota
passed fetal homicide legislation in 1995. See South Dakota: Fetal-Homicide Bill Awaits
Gov's Signature, ABORTION REP., Feb. 21, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wire
Service Stories File. The statutes include the "unborn child" in the definition of homicide
and provide protection in specific homicide and assault statutes. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§§ 22-16-1, -1.1, -20, -41, -42, 22-18-1.2, -1.3.
138. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (1995 & Supp. 1998). The Supreme Court of
Utah previously held that an unborn fetus was not a "person" within the vehicular homi-
cide statute. In 1996, a defendant was charged with two counts of capital murder in the
stabbing death of his girlfriend and her nonviable fetus and pleaded guilty to one count.
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manslaughter law includes "knowingly or recklessly causing the
death of an unborn child at any stage of its development."'39 One
prosecution under this law was for the 1997 shooting of a preg-
nant woman by her ex-boyfriend.' 40 The woman survived, but
her four-month-old fetus was killed.' The case ignited debate
on abortion, with antiabortion activists using the case as an ex-
ample of the need to change abortion laws, and pro-choice activ-
ists maintaining that the case was about a criminal act, not
women's rights.'
Crimes Against Pregnant Women
Several states, including Virginia, that subscribe to the born
alive rule in their homicide statutes, nevertheless penalize ac-
tions against pregnant women that result in miscarriage, or in
some states, injury to the fetus.' These states include New
Mexico,' Wyoming, 45 New Hampshire,' 4  Kansas,'47 Iowa, 4'
See State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280, 1282 (Utah 1978).
139. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(A)(5) (West Supp. 1998).
140. See Susie Steckner, Fetal-Killing Case Provides Fuel for Abortion Debate, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Apr. 13, 1997, at B1, available in 1997 WL 8355886.
141. See id.
142. See id. In another case, the court sentenced a man to 20 years for stabbing his
ex-girlfriend, resulting in the deaths of both the woman and her six-week-old fetus. See
Joe Salkowski, Ex-Wrangler Gets 20 Years in '92 Stabbing Death of Pregnant Girlfriend,
ARIZ. DAILY STAR, June 8, 1993, at 2B, available in 1993 WL 5746738. Another man was
convicted of felony murder, subject to the death penalty, for killing his ex-girlfriend's
sister and eight-month-old fetus. See Pila Martinez, Man, 44, Convicted in Deaths of Ex-
Girlfriend's Sister, Fetus, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Apr. 10, 1996, at 2B, available in 1996 WL
4983644. The Arizona Supreme Court, however, reversed a defendant's manslaughter
conviction because of a faulty jury instruction regarding transferred intent, even though
it upheld his first-degree murder conviction for killing the mother. See State v. Amaya-
Ruiz, 800 P.2d 1260, 1280-81, 1291 (Ariz. 1990) (finding that the statute does not provide
for transferred intent, but rather requires mental states for the crimes against both the
mother and fetus).
143. See infra notes 144-50, 153-75 and accompanying text.
144. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-7 (Michie 1994); id. § 66-8-101.1 (Michie 1998). The
statutes entitled "Injury to pregnant woman" and "Injury to pregnant woman by vehicle,"
provide harsher penalties for injuries caused while driving under the influence. See id. §
66-8-101.1 (Michie 1998). These statutes do not specify any fetal gestational age. See id.
§ 66-8-101.1 (Michie 1998); id. § 30-3-7 (Michie 1994). In 1996, a drunken driver ran a
red light, resulting in the deaths of two women, one of them pregnant. See DWI Deaths
Get Man 8 Years in Prison, ALBUQUERQUE J.-TRIB., Dec. 5, 1996, at A3, available in
WESTLAW, ALBQ-JTRIB Database. The defendant pleaded guilty to charges including
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Ohio, 14 9 and Delaware, i5 ° which consider the pregnant woman
vehicular homicide, injury to a pregnant woman by vehicle, and driving while intoxicated
(DWI). See id. He was sentenced to serve eight years in prison. See id.
145. See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-502(a)(iv) (Lexis 1999) (providing penalties for aggra-
vated assault and battery that cause bodily injury to a pregnant woman). The state also
provides increased penalties for persons who cause miscarriages while driving under the
influence of alcohol. See id. § 31-5-233(h).
146. New Hampshire specifically exempts the fetus from protection under its homi-
cide statutes. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1(IV) (1996). In 1991, however, the legis-
lature considered legislation that would include the fetus in the vehicular homicide stat-
ute. See New Hampshire: No Vote Taken on Fetal Homicide Bill, ABORTION REP., Mar. 1,
1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wire Service Stories File. One pro-choice advo-
cate recommended that the proposed law "focus on the 'mother as victim rather than the
fetus.'" Id. (quoting Susan Arnold from the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights
Action League). The legislature eventually enacted laws that would allow a felony prose-
cution for an assault on a pregnant woman that "[p]urposely or knowingly causes injury"
resulting in miscarriage, without specifying the fetus's gestational age. N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 631:1(I)(c), :2(I)(e) (1999).
147. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3440, -3441 (1995). For further discussion on this
statute, see infra notes 153-75 and accompanying text.
148. Iowa enacted a statute in 1996 criminalizing "[nionconsensual termina-
tion-serious injury to a human pregnancy," IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.8 (West Supp. 2000).
The law covers both intentional and unintentional terminations, and the fetus's gesta-
tional age is not specified. See id. The statute was the result of intense lobbying by two
families who lost viable fetuses as a result of reckless drivers. See Roos Jonathan, House
Approves Pregnancy Bill, DES MOINES REG., Feb. 20, 1996, at 6, available in 1996 WL
6227249. "Any time a woman chooses to become pregnant, she should have the right to
continue that pregnancy," said one of the mothers. Id. The bill's floor manager said "it
provides justice to parents with shattered dreams.'" Id. In April 1998, a man was
charged in accordance with the new law for the beating death of his girlfriend and her
unborn fetus. See Metro Iowa, DES MOINES REG., Apr. 8, 1998, at 4, available in 1998
WL 3203235.
149. In 1996, Ohio legislators passed legislation in response to the death of a woman
and her eight-month-old fetus in a reckless driving incident, when the driver could not
be charged with the fetus's death. See Laura Goldberg, Protection Bill Signed for Fetus,
Law Stems from Local Traffic Death, CIN. ENQUIRER, June 7, 1996, at C1, available in
1996 WL 2245181; Hands Off. Ohio 'Feticide" Bill Jeopardized by Abortion Meddling in
the House, CIN. ENQUIRER, Apr. 23, 1996, at A6, available in 1996 WL 2239572; Randy
Ludlow, Ohio Lawmakers Pass "Feticide" Bill, Death of Unborn by Crime Punishable,
CIN. POST, May 30, 1996, at 8A, available in 1996 WL 5062237. See generally David M.
Henry, Comment, Feticide: Time to End Ohio's Blind Imitation of the Past, 17 OHIo N.U.
L. REV. 659 (1991) (proposing changes to Ohio statutes that would include feticide). The
legislature modified existing homicide statutes to add the phrase "unlawful termination
of another's pregnancy." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.01-.07 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999).
The legislation also defined "another's unborn" as a victim in various types of assault,
adopting a two-pronged approach to punishment for fetal injuries or death. See id. §
2903.08, .11, .14 (West 1997). The laws cover fertilization until birth. See id. § 2903.09. A
military court convicted an Air Force member of involuntary manslaughter, assault, and
aggravated assault for beating his wife and causing her miscarriage. See Major Michael
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the victim of the criminal act, rather than the fetus. In so doing,
avoid the issue of whether the fetus is a "victim" or a "person."151
The potential exists for the resulting criminal penalties to be
substantially the same or greater than statutes that criminalize
actions against the fetus, depending on the way the legislatures
craft the statutes. 52
Several states that seek to protect the woman have developed
fetal homicide statutes in response to specific homicide incidents
or court decisions. Having changed its approach to fetal homi-
cide several times since 1985, the state of Kansas provides a
useful illustration of such development. The Kansas Supreme
Court appeared to abrogate the born alive rule in 1985 in State
v. Burrell.'53 It subsequently reinforced the rule in 1988, however,
in State v. Trudell'5 and again in 1989, in State v. Green.'55 In
Burrell, the defendant ran a stop sign and struck another car.
15 6
A passenger was thrown from the car, killing the passenger and
her viable fetus. 157 The defendant was charged with two counts
J. Davidson, Fetal Crime and Its Cognizability as a Criminal Offense Under Military
Law, AIiY LAW., July 1998, at 23 (describing the Robbins case and also providing an
excellent overview of fetal crimes in the military context); Ohio. Airman Sentenced to 8
Years for Fetal Homicide, ABORTION REP., Dec. 11, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Wire Service Stories File. This was the first test of the new law. See id. Other per-
sons have been convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide under the new laws for caus-
ing fetal deaths on the road. See Kristen Delguzzi, Driver Guilty in Death. Juror: Fetus
Law Didn't Sway Verdict, CIN. ENQUIRER, May 3, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL
5448835 (reporting the conviction of a woman in a "road rage" incident); Mark Gillispie,
Driver Sentenced to Prison for Role in Fatal Car Crash, CLaV. PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 20,
1998, at 1B, available in 1998 WL 4150017 (reporting the conviction of a man in a drunk
driving incident).
150. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 222(22), 605-06, 612(a)(9) (Supp. 1999). Delaware
enacted laws making it a felony to abuse or assault pregnant women. See Judge Sentenc-
es Waterman to Life in Prison for Killing Pregnant Wife, A.P. NEWSWIRES, Dec. 3, 1999,
available in WESTLAW, APWIRES Database. The legislature acted in response to the
case of a defendant who strangled his wife two days before she was to give birth. See id.
151. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-7 (Michie 1994); id. § 66-8-101.1 (Michie 1998).
152. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-31(11), -32.1, -51.2(B) (Michie Supp. 1999). Under
the capital murder statute in Virginia, for example, a defendant can receive the death
penalty for the premeditated intentional murder of a pregnant woman.
153. 699 P.2d 499 (Kan. 1985).
154. 755 P.2d 511 (Kan. 1985).
155. 781 P.2d 678 (Kan. 1989).
156. See Burrell, 699 P.2d at 500.
157. See id.
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of involuntary manslaughter.'58 The court, without comment, ap-
peared to abandon the born alive rule by reversing, on other
grounds, the trial court's dismissal of the two charges, and re-
manding the case.'59
In 1988, the Trudell court considered the case of a defendant
charged with aggravated vehicular homicide. 60 The court noted
that Kansas had a feticide statute in effect from 1855 to 1969,
but that the state criminal code enacted in 1969 did not include
an equivalent law.'6 ' The court considered as dicta a statement
in Burrell that referred to the mother and fetus as "'two human
beings.'' 1 2 One year later in Green, the court considered the case
of a defendant charged with the first-degree murder of his for-
mer girlfriend and her unborn fetus. 61 The court applied its
rationale from Trudell and held that the viable fetus was not a
person for purposes of the murder statute.164
In 1995, the Kansas state legislature responded to these cases
with new fetal homicide legislation.'65 The two new laws provided
penalties for injuries to pregnant women. 166 The first statute
relates to injuries caused to a pregnant woman in the commis-
sion of a felony or misdemeanor resulting in miscarriage. 161 The
other statute relates to miscarriage-producing injuries caused by
a vehicle, with more severe penalties for injuries caused while
driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.168 Originally, the
bill was drafted to define a "'preborn human being' as 'a human
being in existence from fertilization until birth." 69 Abortion-
rights advocates said "the bill went too far," because "abortion
could become first-degree murder."7 0 The legislature revised the
158. See id.
159. See id. at 503.
160. See State v. Trudell, 755 P.2d 511, 512 (Kan. 1988).
161. See id. at 513.
162. Id. at 514 (quoting Burrell, 699 P.2d at 502).
163. See State v. Green, 781 P.2d 678, 681 (Kan. 1989).
164. See id. at 683.
165. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3440, -3441 (1995).
166. See id.
167. See id. § 21-3440.
168. See id. § 21-3441.
169. Judy Lundstrom Thomas, Panel Sets Wording of-Fetal Death Measure, WICHITA




proposal and modeled it after New Mexico's laws penalizing
those who cause miscarriages by injury to the woman.17 Addi-
tionally, like the New Mexico statutes, the Kansas statute does
not specify the fetus's gestational age. 72 Pro-choice and pro-life
activists were pleased with the final result.'7 s Peggy Jarman,
pro-choice lobbyist said, "'[slounds OK.'... 'As I said before,
there's a way to do this right. Sounds to me like they've figured
out how to do that.'"'74 Abortion opponent Senator Don Sallee,
sponsor of the original measure, said, "'Lylou did what I
asked.'... 'You didn't throw it in the trash, and you're trying to
make it work. It appears to me like you're doing what I set out
to do." 75
THE DIMENSIONS OF FETAL PROTECTION LAws
Identifying the Victim
The preceding survey demonstrates that state legislatures and
courts can choose between two approaches to penalizing fetal






176. Several states have considered fetal homicide legislation in the past few years.
See A.B. 722, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999-2000) (proposed DUI manslaughter bill); S.B. 249,
Reg. Sess. (Ky. 1998) (1998 proposal to define human being from fertilization to death);
HILL. 805, 119th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 1999) (proposed laws on crimes against unborn
children); H.B. 4476, 89th Leg., Reg. Seas. (Mich. 1997) (injury to pregnant woman bill);
S.B. 21, 89th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1997) (pregnant woman and prenatal protection
act); L.B. 111, 96th Leg., 1999 Reg. Sess. (Neb.) (proposed bill defining "unborn child"
and redefining "person" in homicide laws); A. 2524, 208th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 1998)
(feticide bill); S.B. 2171, 222d Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999) (proposed laws on fetal death and
injury); H.B. 920, 1999 Reg. Sess. (N.C.) (proposed statute on injury to pregnant woman
by vehicle); S.B. 188, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999) (proposed laws on injury to preg-
nant woman); H.B. 357, 65th Biennial Sess. (Vt. 1999) (proposed statutes on crimes
against fetuses); see also Peggy Fikac, Senate Passes Bill Toughening Sanctions for As-
saulting Pregnant Women, A.P. NEWSWIRES, Mar. 31, 1999, available in WESTLAW,
APWIRES Database (describing Texas's proposed statutes on assaults against pregnant
women); Joseph Gerth, 1998 Kentucky General Assembly; House Backs Bill to Protect
Fetuses, Sponsor Calls It a Step Toward Ban On Abortions, COURIER-J. (Louisville, KY),
Feb. 21, 1998, at 1A, available in 1998 WL 2098128 (describing efforts in Kentucky to
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Either the fetus or the pregnant woman can be considered the
victim of a crime that results in fetal death or injury. Several
factors potentially impact a state's decision concerning which
approach will best suit its needs, as well as provide laws that
will be feasible politically. The predominant factor is the impact
of the proposed legislation on abortion. In addition, there are
structural considerations for state legislatures creating new
laws. States choosing to criminalize actions against fetuses or
pregnant women can either modify existing statutes or create
new statutes to include fetuses or pregnant women as victims.
Among the states that treat fetuses as victims, five state legis-
latures modified existing statutes to include fetuses as victims of
crime," whereas sixteen state legislatures created new statutes
to cover crimes against the fetus. 7 8 If a state wants to classify
the fetus as victim, there are several advantages to creating
separate statutes specifically covering criminal actions against
the fetus rather than merely expanding the definition of "victim"
or "person" to include the fetus in existing homicide and assault
statutes. One major concern expressed during the Virginia feti-
cide bill hearings was that establishing the fetus as a person in
the homicide laws would lead to attempts to classify the fetus as
a person in other laws, such as wrongful death laws.'79 Crafting
enact fetal protection legislation); Terrence Stutz, Bill Would Make It a Felony to Injure
Pregnant Women, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 31, 1999, at 23A, available in 1999 WL
4111254 (describing Texas's proposed legislation); Robynn Tysver, Lawmakers Debate
When Life Begins, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Mar. 5, 1999, at 15, available in 1999 WL
4490657 (describing Nebraska's debate over fetal homicide law).
177. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103.A.5 (West 1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-
102(13)(B) (Michie Supp. 1999); CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-13-214 (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (1995 & Supp. 1998).
178. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (1999); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2, -2.1, -3.2, 5/12-3.1, -4.4 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. §§
35-42-1-1(4), -42-1-6 (Michie 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:2(7)(11), :32.5, :32.9 (West
1997 & Supp. 1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.322 (West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 609.266, .2661-.2665, .267-.2672, .268 (West Supp. 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37
(1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.205.3 (West 1969 & Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
200.210 (Michie 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17.1-01, -02 to -06 (1997); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2601-2609 (West 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5 (1994); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 22-1-2(50A), -16-1, -16-1.1 (Michie 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060
(West 1988 & Supp. 1999); 1998 Wis. Legis. Serv. 295 (West).
179. See Ellen Nakashima, Va. Debates Law on Fetal Homicide; Legislation Entan-
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separate laws for crimes against the fetus would segregate those
laws from laws protecting the already born, and a state could
identify the fetus as a victim or person solely for the laws specif-
ically related to the fetus. Another major concern, particularly
from the perspective of pro-choice advocates, is that defining
fetuses as victims or persons within existing statutes would in-
crease the threat to a woman's right to choose.18° Pro-choice
advocates believe that if enough states specifically declare fetuses
as victims or persons, even with exceptions for legal abortions,
the Supreme Court might -use the declarations as evidence to
overturn Roe.1 8l One author also expressed his belief that it
"would be more difficult to protect potential human life fully"
with fetal protection scattered throughout the state's criminal
code.182 In addition, having a separate section of the law for
crimes against the fetus allows the legislature to craft separate
penalties for such crimes, instead of necessarily having the same
penalties as for living persons who are later killed.'"
States that focus on the pregnant woman as the victim also
have crafted either separate legislation or identified the preg-
nant woman as victim in existing statutes. Kansas, New Mexico,
and Iowa crafted separate legislation to cover injuries to preg-
gled with Abortion Issue, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1996, at D1. See generally Murphy S.
Kiasing, The Death of an Unborn Child: Jurisprudential Inconsistencies in Wrongful
Death, Criminal Homicide, and Abortion Cases, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 933 (1995) (detailing
state statutes regarding wrongful deaths of fetuses).
180. See, e.g., Peter Baker & Spencer S. Hau, Virginia Assembly Focuses on Abortion,
House Passes Notification Bill; Senate Seeks to Outlaw Feticide, WASH. POST, Feb. 14,
1996, at C3 (describing the criticism of pro-choice activists that passing the feticide bill
could result in a "slippery slope" that could end up limiting abortion rights).
181. See Kiasing, supra note 179, at 966 (explaining the conflict between a woman's
right to terminate her pregnancy and a wrongful death act on behalf of the same fetus)
(citing Toth v. Goree, 237 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975)); see also What's Wrong
with Fetal Rights: A Look at Fetal Protection Statutes and Wrongful Death Actions on
Behalf of Fetuses (last modified July 1996) <http://www.aclu.orgfissues/reproductt
fetal.html> [hereinafter Fetal Rights] (providing a list of factors, devised by the ACLU, to
be considered when drafting fetal protection legislation).
182. Jeffrey A. Parness, Crimes Against the Unborn: Protecting and Respecting the
Potentiality of Human Life, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 97, 136 n.169 (1985).
183. SeeBickaA. BarlowSevere Penalties for the Destruction of "Potential Life--Cruet
and Unusual Punishment?, 29 U.S.F. L. REv. 463, 502-03 (1995).
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nant women resulting in miscarriage.' The other states identi-
fying the pregnant woman as a victim, including Virginia, iden-
tified the crimes in existing statutes in the criminal code, gener-
ally in separate paragraphs or sections. 8 Either approach is
effective because the focus is on the pregnant woman alone as
victim. No conflicts arise between the rights of the mother and
fetus if the fetus is lost through actions of a third party causing
miscarriage, because the two entities are treated as one. Result-
ing statutes avoid the problems of encroaching on abortion
rights or attempting to include the fetus in other areas of law,
such as wrongful death.
One disadvantage of identifying the pregnant woman as vic-
tim, however, has been expressed by family members of victims
who believe that the accused should be charged with two sepa-
rate crimes, one for the woman and one for the fetus. 6
Scope of the Legislation
Another important consideration for states enacting fetal
homicide statutes is the scope of the legislation. The state must
decide how broadly its law will sweep, and, in particular, whether
the statute will cover only homicide or include offenses causing
fetal injury. The state statutes focusing on the fetus as victim
vary widely in scope. Twelve states only penalize some form of
homicide (murder, feticide, or manslaughter),187 whereas nine
184. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.8 (West 1993), amended by § 707.8 (West Supp.
1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3440, -3441 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-7 (Michie
1994); id. § 66-8-101.1 (Michie 1998).
185. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-201(5)(A)-(C) (Michie 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 222(22), 605-06, 612(a)(9) (Supp. 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.01-.08, .11, .14
(West 1997); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-31, -32.1, -51.2 (Michie Supp. 1999); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-2-502(a)(iv) (Michie 1999).
186. See Joy Powell, Homicide Law Doesn't Cover Fetus in Crash, OMAHA WORLD-
HERALD, Feb. 20, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 6293299 (describing parents and
grandparents as upset that a drunken driver would not be penalized separately for caus-
ing the death of a fetus in a motor vehicle accident).
187. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103.A.5 (West 1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102
(Supp. 1999); CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West
1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (1999); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-42-1-1(4), -1-6 (Michie
1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.5 (West 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.322
(West 1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (1999); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.210 (Michie
1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5 (1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (1995 & Supp.
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states cover both death and injury to the fetus. 8 ' Generally, the
comprehensive statutes were written in response to specific
incidents, and the legislatures intended to respond to any possi-
ble crimes against the fetus. As a result, the statutes also have
widely varying intent requirements. 8 9 The most common prob-
lem identified with statutes including injury to the fetus is de-
termining causation.' 90
Statutes focusing on the woman as victim also vary in scope.
Iowa's statute includes "nonconsensual termination or serious
injury to a human pregnancy" during the commission of various
crimes, and includes acts that unintentionally terminate or "in-
jure" the pregnancy.' 9' Similarly, Ohio's laws cover crimes
against the pregnant woman ranging from murder to assault.'92
The other state laws that focus on the woman as victim are
narrower in scope and center on death or injury to the woman
rather than injury to the fetus. 9 '
1998).
188. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2, -2.1, -3.2, 5/12-3.1, -4.4 (West 1993) (in-
cluding intentional homicide, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, reck-
less homicide, battery, and aggravated battery); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.266, .2661-
.2665, .267-.2672, .268 (West Supp. 1999) (including first, second and third-degree mur-
der, first and second-degree manslaughter, injury or death in the commission of a crime,
and assault); MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.205.2 (West Supp. 1999) (declaring that the fetus is
considered a person for the purposes of all state statutes); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17.1-
01, -02 to -06 (1997) (including murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide, aggravated
assault and assault); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2601-2609 (West 1998) (including first,
second and third-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-1-2(50A), -16-1, -16-1.1, -16-20, -16-41 to -42 (Michie 1998) (includ-
ing fetal homicide, second-degree manslaughter, vehicular homicide and vehicular bat-
tery); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-214 (1997) (including homicide and assault); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060 (West Supp. 1999) (including manslaughter); id. § 9A.36.021
(including assault); 1998 Wis. Legis. Serv. 295 (West) (including crimes similar to that
covered in Minnesota).
189. See Barlow, supra note 183, at 485-89.
190. See id. at 482-84 (citing People v. Campos, 592 N.E.2d 85 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)).
The court determined that a causal link existed between a gunshot wound to the mother
and the resultant deaths of both mother and fetus. See id.
191. IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.8 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999).
192. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.01-.08, .11, .14 (West 1997). Ohio Code sec-
tions 2903.11 and 2903.14, discussing assault, include assault against both "another and
another's unborn." Id. §§ 2903.11, .14.
193. See DEL. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 222(22), 605-06, 612(a)(9) (1995) (including abuse
of a pregnant female and recklessly or intentionally causing physical injury to a preg-
nant female); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3440, -3441 (1995) (including injury and injury by
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Gestational Age Protected
States choosing to focus on either the fetus or pregnant woman
as victim should be concerned about the gestational age protected.
Statutes focusing on the fetus as victim, however, encounter
different problems than those focusing on the woman. In stat-
utes focusing on the fetus, the fetal gestational age chosen for
protection depends in large measure on the level of the accused's
intent. Where the accused knows that the woman is pregnant
and intends to harm her or terminate the pregnancy, gestational
age should not matter. Conversely, when the accused does not
know the woman is pregnant, protecting all fetuses from fertil-
ization becomes more problematic.
The "quickening" standard, although used by several states, is
currently a vague standard with little medical significance."
Likewise, imposing liability beginning as early as conception
presents problems due to fetal fragility and miscarriage. 9 ' A
large percentage of pregnancies spontaneously terminate before
the woman knows she is pregnant.'96 Consequently, an accused
could be convicted of homicide during the period when there is a
high rate of termination from forces other than the accused's ac-
tions.'97 Justice Mosk expressed this concern in People v. Da-
vis, '9 in which the California Supreme Court held that fetal via-
bility was not a requirement for a homicide conviction, and that
a seven-week-old fetus could be covered under the murder stat-
ute."'99 Justice Mosk's primary concern was that a defendant
conceivably could be convicted of felony (capital) murder for
causing the death of something "roughly the size and weight of a
vehicle); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 631:1.I.(c), :1.II., :2.I.(e), :2.II. (1996) (including first and
second-degree assault); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-7 (Michie 1994); id. § 66-8-101.1 (Michie
1998) (including injury and injury by vehicle); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-31, -32.1, -51.2
(Michie Supp. 1999) (including capital murder, murder, and aggravated malicious
wounding); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-502(a)(iv) (Michie 1999) (including aggravated assault
and battery).
194. See Barlow, supra note 183, at 498.
195. See id. at 499.
196. See id. at 493.
197. See id.
198. 872 P.2d 591, 602-20 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
199. See id. at 602.
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peanut."2 ' He also hypothesized that if an unarmed individual
shoplifts, and in his haste to escape knocks a woman to the
floor, causing her to miscarry (even if she does not know she is
pregnant), the defendant could be charged and convicted of felony
murder.20 ' He noted that in cases concerning early pregnancies,
causation might be more difficult to prove because a high per-
centage of such pregnancies end in spontaneous abortion.2 2 It
might be difficult to prove whether the defendant's actions
caused fetal death, or the death was the result of natural causes.
20 3
On the other hand, viability can be determined by objective
medical standards.2°4 As a result of Roe, the standard is well
established, such that a statute drawing the line at viability
would protect fetuses that have a high potential of independent
life.20 5 In addition, state laws establish processes for abortions
after viability.2 6 Specifically, performing abortions or causing
miscarriages are lawful after the second trimester only if "the
continuation of the pregnancy is likely to result in the death of
the woman or substantially and irremediably impair the mental
or physical health of the woman." °7 In addition, the attending
physicians are required to have life support available and use it
if there is "clearly visible evidence of viability."0 8 Such condi-
tions lend further support to establish the threshold for criminal
liability at viability, because at that point the state has an es-
tablished interest in protecting "potential life" per Roe.2 °9 Un-
fortunately, the states defining the fetus as victim have specified
only one gestational age, regardless of the level of intent re-
quired for the offense.
Statutes that define the pregnant woman as the victim have
the same gestational age concerns, depending on the intent
required for conviction. The states currently focusing on the
200. Id. at 614 (citing 20 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrrANNICA (15th ed. 1990)).
201. See id. at 619.
202. See id. at 620.
203. See id.
204. See Barlow, supra note 183, at 498.
205. See id. at 498-99.
206. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74 (Michie 1996).
207. Id. § 18.2-74(b).
208. Id. § 18.2-74(c).
209. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
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pregnant woman as victim either do not specify fetal gestational
age, meaning convictions at any gestational age are possible, or
specify gestational age at fertilization.21 These states run the
same risks as those who focus on the fetus as victim, and thus
states considering focusing on the woman as victim should also
consider varying the fetal gestational age with different levels of
intent. Currently Virginia has limited culpability to those who
intentionally kill or injure women that they know are pregnant,
and therefore gestational age should not matter in those specific
intent situations.2 ' As a result, under revised Virginia laws, a
court conceivably could punish perpetrators such as those in
Keeler v. Superior Court,2" Hollis v. Commonwealth,213 and State
v. Beale, 2 1 who could not be punished under their states' exist-
ing laws.
ACLU Factors
A predominant consideration for any state contemplating fetal
homicide legislation is the impact the legislation will have on a
woman's right to choose. The ACLU has been active in scrutiniz-
ing proposed fetal protection legislation. This scrutinization has
been to ensure that the proposals (1) do not infringe on a
woman's right to choose, (2) discourage the "policing" of pregnan-
cy, and (3) do not violate due process rights.2 5 To that end, they
devised a list of six factors for legislators and pro-choice activists
to consider when drafting and evaluating such legislation. First,
the bill should define the woman alone as the victim, as opposed
to the fetus alone, or both the woman and the fetus. 16 If the
state does not include such exceptions, then the proposal will
probably be stiffly opposed by pro-choice activists who might
210. See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
211. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31, -32.1, -51.2 (Michie Supp. 1999).
212. 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970); see supra text accompanying notes 20-28.
213. 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983); see supra note 32.
214. 376 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1989); see supra text accompanying notes 33-43.




view it as a threat to abortion rights," as well as by groups op:
posed to laws criminalizing maternal behavior during pregnan-
cy.2 8 Second, in order to diffuse pro-choice opposition, the bill
should have an exemption for abortions and the woman's con-
duct.1 Statutes that characterize the pregnant woman as victim
do not share the same problems because they penalize actions of
others against pregnant women, rather than the fetus and do
not focus on the potential actions of the pregnant woman. Third,
the language used to describe the fetus should not include anti-
choice terms such as "pre-born" or "unborn child."122 Fourth, to
comport with due process, the bill should require adequate
knowledge or intent to commit the crime.221 Fifth, the terms and
prohibited conduct should be defined precisely to avoid vague-
ness concerns. 222 Sixth, the penalties for causing fetal death
should not be as severe as for killing a live person.2 ' Aligning
proposed legislation with these factors can help avoid conflicts
with pro-choice advocates.
217. Ifstates specify the fetus as victim, any proposed legislation should include spe-
cificexceptions forlegal abortion and the conductofthe mother. For example, North Dakota's
statute has the following exception regarding abortion:
This chapter does not apply to acts or omissions that cause the death or injury
of an unborn child if those acts or omissions are committed during an abortion
performed by or under the supervision of a licensed physician to which the
pregnant woman has consented, nor does it apply to acts or omissions that are
committed pursuant to usual and customary standards of medical practice
during diagnostic or therapeutic treatment performed by or under the
supervision of a licensed physician.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17.1-07 (1997). Similarly, Missouri's statute includes the following
exception regarding conduct of the pregnant woman: "Nothing in this section shall be
interpreted as creating a cause of action against a woman for indirectly harming her
unborn child by failing to properly care for herself or by failing to follow any particular
program of prenatal care." MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.205.4 (West Supp. 1999). The problems of
maternal abuse are beyond the scope of this Note.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
All States
State legislatures enacting fetal homicide statutes should con-
sider all of the dimensions and factors discussed previously. Spe-
cifically, if focusing on the fetus as the victim, state legislatures
should refer to the Illinois statutes because they offer compre-
hensive treatment of fetal homicide and identify appropriate
levels of intent without being too broad.2"
Illinois defines a fetus as an "unborn child" from fertilization
until birth.2 5 Only in the involuntary manslaughter and reckless
homicide statutes is the definition potentially problematic. In all
other relevant offenses the accused must act intentionally or
knowingly.226 The laws exempt lawful abortion, although they do
not specifically exempt other actions of the pregnant woman.227
Illinois courts have upheld these statutes.228 In People v. Ford,29
the court held that [cilearly, a pregnant woman who chooses to
terminate her pregnancy and the defendant who assaults a preg-
nant woman, causing the death of her fetus, are not similarly
situated."3 0 The court said that even though the statute defined
"unborn child," it did not need to determine when human life
begins because the statute only required proof that the "entity"
was alive, and that it died due to the defendant's actions.2 31
Another Illinois court considered the causation issue in People
v. Campos.23 ' The defendant shot his wife, who was pregnant
with a five-month-old fetus.233 For eight days, the woman was in
224. See 720 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2, -2.1, -3.2, 5/12-3.1, -4.4 (West 1993). The
statutes include intentional homicide, voluntary manslaugter, involuntary manslaughter,
reckless homicide, battery, and aggravated battery.
225. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2, -2.1, -3.2, 5/12-3.1.
226. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2, -2.1, -3.2, 5/12-3.1, -4.4.
227. See id.
228. See generally Craig 0. Smith, Legal Murder: The Intentional Killing of the Un-
born, 11 CRIM. JUST. J. 423 (1989) (describing judicial review of feticide statutes and
generally addressing the issue of fetal homicide).
229. 581 N.E.2d 1189 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
230. Id. at 1199.
231. See id. at 1201.
232. 592 N.E.2d 85 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
233. See id. at 89.
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a coma and brain dead, and the fetus was stillborn shortly be-
fore the woman was pronounced dead.2' The bullet the defen-
dant fired at the woman did not injure the fetus directly, but the
medical examiner determined that the fetus was stillborn due to
the woman's lack of oxygen. 3 5 The defendant claimed that his
act did not cause the fetus's death, but the court inferred that
the trauma to the woman ultimately caused the fetus's death,
and thus the causal link was established.236
Evaluating the Illinois statutes in light of the ACLU factors,237
the only areas where the statutes do not align with the ACLU
factors are the terms used to characterize the victim ("unborn
child" as opposed to "fetus"), and the penalties for killing a fetus
are essentially the same as those for killing live persons, except
that the death penalty is not available for intentional homicide.
Crafting legislation based on the Illinois statutes, with several
changes, might more easily satisfy pro-choice activists. Suggested
changes include using the term "fetus" instead of "unborn child,"
establishing viability as the gestational age for the involuntary
manslaughter and reckless homicide provisions, specifically
exempting actions of the pregnant woman, and possibly crafting
lesser penalties for crimes against the fetus than for crimes
against living persons.
State legislatures focusing on the pregnant woman as victim
have two promising alternatives. The Kansas and New Mexico
statutes cover a wide range of offenses, 23 8 but could be improved
by specifying viability as the appropriate gestational age for
offenses involving reckless or negligent conduct where the defen-
dant does not know that the victim is pregnant. The Virginia
statutes are targeted more specifically at defendants who kill
the pregnant woman with the intent to terminate the pregnancy,
or intentionally harm the woman knowing she is pregnant.2 9
These statutes cover the vast majority of cases considered by
other jurisdictions evaluated in this Note, particularly those
234. See id.
235. See id. at 96.
236. See id.
237. See Fetal Rights, supra note 181; supra text accompanying note 218.
238. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3440 to -3441 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-7
(Michie 1994); id. § 66-8-101.1 (Michie Supp. 1998).
239. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31, -32.1, -51.2 (Michie Supp. 1999).
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involving domestic violence. The Kansas, New Mexico, and Vir-
ginia statutes appear to satisfy the ACLU factors regarding fetal
protection2 ° and would also protect the woman's right to choose
abortion or to carry to term without interference from a third
party.
State legislatures interested in creating fetal homicide stat-
utes should focus on the pregnant woman as victim, rather than
on the fetus itself. State legislatures that have focused on the
pregnant woman as victim generally have met with less opposi-
tion from pro-choice activists, and also have met with support
from groups concerned about domestic violence. 241 These states,
thus, are able to satisfy concerns from groups representing var-
ious perspectives, while punishing those who commit crimes
against women that result in miscarriages.
Virginia
As noted above, Virginia has enacted laws to protect pregnant
women. 2 Vehicular homicide is the one crime among these
1
240. See Fetal Rights, supra note 181; supra text accompanying note 218.
241. See, eg., supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 239 and accompanying text. The current Virginia law originated
on January 22, 1996, with the introduction of Virginia Bill 495 by former State Senator,
and current Virginia attorney general, Mark L. Earley. See S.B. 495, 1996 Reg. Sess.
(Va.). The bill provided that "a fetus is considered a person and can be the victim of a
murder." Id.
Earley proposed the bill in response to the murder of a pregnant woman and her
unborn child. See Mike Allen, 'Feticide' Could Be Outlawed, Legal Abortion Would Be
Exempt, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 12, 1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL 2290309
[hereinafter Allen, Outlawed]. Earley said that "Ithe family was distraught, and the in-
tensity of their loss was exacerbated when they learned that no additional punishment
would be imposed on the offender for killing the victim's fetus." Id. The Senate Commit-
tee for Courts of Justice amended the bill to allow the killer of an unborn to be subject to
the charge of first or second-degree murder, depending on the absence or presence of pre-
meditation.
The proposal received vigorous debate in the General Assembly and the press.
Alexandria's commonwealth attorney, John E. Kloch, was concerned with where the bill
would lead, stating, "[i]f a fetus, by this statute, is now a person, can this fetus inherit
property? Do social services have an obligation to support it?... This starts on a philo-
sophical train [and] we don't know where it goes." Nakashima, supra note 179, at D1.
The debate also centered around the bill's potential impact on a woman's right to choose
to have an abortion, despite its specific exclusion from the bill. See Baker & Hau, supra
note 180, at C3. In support of the law, Virginia's chief medical examiner remarked:
I have never had a homicide of a mother go to court where it was permitted
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existing laws that, if amended, would further protect the right of
pregnant women to carry to term.
Currently, Virginia law does not provide penalties for persons
causing miscarriages in drunken driving incidents. Of the twenty-
four states focusing on the fetus as a victim, sixteen provide
penalties for some form of vehicular homicide either by statute
or judicial interpretation.2  Of the eight states that focus on the
to say she was pregnant, and that the infant was killed. Its a free homicide.
How would you feel if you were sitting there examining a baby that was
perfect and had a bullet through its brain, and know that this was not a
crime?
Allen, supra, at Al (concluding that "for any battered woman in this commonwealth, we
ought to send a loud and clear message that you cannot beat on pregnant women and
not get a stiffer charge"). The main opposition to the feticide bill came from pro-choice
forces. Although the bill would have exempted legal abortion, as Planned Parenthood
lobbyist Karen Raschke told Virginia senators, "[i]fyou call a fetus a person for the pur-
pose of the homicide statutes, it makes it arguable that a fetus is a person for the pur-
poses of abortion." Id. Adding fuel to the fire was the fact that admittedly antiabortion
state senators sponsored the bill. See Kerry Dougherty, Editorial, Do We Really Need a
Feticide Bill?, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 24, 1996, at All, available in 1996 WL 5986302.
They were accused of having a secret agenda: Have the Commonwealth acknowledge a
viable fetus as a person, with the intent of opening the door to restricting abortions. See
Mike Allen, Subpanel Rejects Reticide' Bill, Full House Panel Debates It Today, RICH.
TnMs-DISPATCH, Mar. 4, 1996, at Al [hereinafter Allen, Rejects]; Susie Dorsey, Editorial,
Honest Talk Still Needed on Abortion, DAILY PRESS (Newport News, Va.), Mar. 17, 1996,
at H3.
Ultimately, the feticide bill failed when an alternative measure passed in 1997 that
focused on the pregnant woman as the victim, rather than the fetus. See Allen, Rejects
supra, at Al; Nakashima, supra note 179, at D1. The legislation, which modified the
state's capital murder, murder, and aggravated malicious wounding statutes, see VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-31, -32.1, -51.2 (Michie Supp. 1999), enjoyed the strong support of
Planned Parenthood of Virginia. See David M. Poole, House Panel Nixes Reticide' as
Separate Murder Charge, Raises Prison Term 5 Years Instead, ROANOKE TIMES, Nov. 26,
1996, at C3, available in 1996 WL 6060830 (quoting Karen Raschke, "We are recognizing
the horrible injury suffered by these women").
243. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-201 (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.071 (West
Supp. 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-393.1 (1997); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-3.2 (West
1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-4 (Michie 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.8 (West
1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.21 (West Supp. 1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.024 (West
1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17.1-04 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-41 (Michie
1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-213(a)(2) (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (1995);
1998 Wis. Legis. Serv. 295 (West). Massachusetts, Oklahoma, and South Carolina have
included viable fetuses in vehicular homicide laws by judicial interpretation. In addition,
Pennsylvania's voluntary manslaughter of an unborn child statute includes negligent or
reckless conduct, and thus possibly covers vehicular homicide. Of the eight states that do
not include vehicular homicide, only seven penalize crimes against the fetus as man-
slaughter, while California only punishes fetal murder. See generally James J. Dietrich,
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pregnant woman as victim, Iowa, Kansas, New Mexico, Ohio,
and Wyoming include vehicular homicide or drunken driving
accidents that result in miscarriage as an offense.2 4 One way to
punish this conduct under the Virginia Code would be to include
it in section 8.2-51.4, which pertains to maiming that results
from driving under the influence (DUI).2 45 Punishment for this
offense, a class six felony, is defined in section 18.2-10(f), with a
maximum punishment of one to five years imprisonment.246
Although the penalty is not as severe as for similar crimes in
other states, this proposal would recognize the involuntary ter-
mination of a woman's pregnancy as a punishable offense. The
Virginia Code could also be modified in section 18.2-36.1, linking
DUI manslaughter with maiming. 247 The statute should draw
Problems and Charging Choices in Prosecuting Vehicular Fatalities, PROSECUTOR, Jan.-
Feb. 1997, at 32 (describing prosecutors' options regarding vehicular homicide and tradi-
tional homicide); Alan Hersh, Tragedy Behind the Wheel: Understanding Manslaughter
by Culpable Negligence, Vehicular Homicide, and DUI Manslaughter, FLA. B.J., Dec.
1992, at 46 (describing the three most common motor vehicle homicide charges).
244. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.8 (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3441 (1995);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-101.1 (Michie Supp. 1998); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.04
(West 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-5-233 (Lexis 1999).
245. The Virginia Code currently states:
Any person who, as a result of driving while intoxicated in violation of §18.2-
266 or any local ordinance substantially similar thereto in a manner so gross,
wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life, uninten-
tionally causes the serious bodily injury of another person resulting in per-
manent and significant physical impairment shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.
VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-51.4(A) (Michie Supp. 1999).
Under the suggestion offered here, the following language would be added: For the
purposes of this section, the involuntary termination of a woman's viable pregnancy shall
be deemed a serious bodily injury resulting in permanent and significant physical im-
pairment.
246. The Virginia Code currently states:
For Class 6 felonies, a term of imprisonment of not less than one year nor
more than five years, or in the discretion of the jury or the court trying the
case without a jury, confinement in jail for not more than twelve months and
a fine of not more than $2,500, either or both.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10(f) (Michie 1996).-
247. The Virginia Code currently states: "Any person who, as a result of driving un-
der the influence in violation of subdivision (ii),(iii), or (iv) of § 18.2-266, unintentionally
causes the death of another person, shall be guilty of involuntary manslaughter." Id.
§ 18.2-36.1. The following language could be added to link DUI manslaughter with
maiming- If, in addition, the victim was a pregnant woman, and the involuntary termi-
nation of her viable pregnancy resulted from her death, any person subject to prosecution
under this section shall also be subject to prosecution under § 18.2-51.4.
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the gestational age line at viability. If enacted, the proposal
would punish a drunken driver for causing the miscarriage of a
viable fetus regardless of whether the pregnant woman survived.
Linking DUI manslaughter and maiming would not result in
prosecuting someone for two crimes with the same elements. A
demonstration of this principle occurred when the Court of Ap-
peals of New Mexico upheld that state's injury to pregnant wom-
an by vehicle statute in 1987 in State v. Begay.' The defendant
in Begay was charged with vehicular homicide and injury to a
pregnant woman as a result of a head-on collision while driving
under the influence. 9 The victim and her unborn fetus were
both killed, along with another woman.2"0 The defendant asserted
the two charges should merge because "vehicular homicide of the
pregnant woman necessarily includes injury to a pregnant wom-
an."251 The court disagreed, concluding that "either offense can
be committed without committing the other offense."252 The court
noted that "the legislative intent in enacting the two statutes is
to punish a person who violates the two statutes under the pro-
visions of both,"25 3 and went on to hold that the two statutes did
not merge.2
Similarly, the proposed changes to Virginia law would result
in prosecuting a drunken driver for actions resulting in a preg-
nant woman's death or miscarriage. This policy would be in
general alignment with continuing movement toward greater
liability for those who drive while under the influence of alcohol
and cause death or injury as a result.255 If these statutes were in
effect in 1998, the driver who hit Sabrina Adkinson could have
been prosecuted for causing both Sabrina's and Destiny's deaths.
248. 734 P.2d 278 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987).
249. See Id. at 279.
250. See id.




255. See generally Hersh, supra note 243 (describing the three most common motor
vehicle homicide charges).
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CONCLUSION
States have adopted fetal homicide legislation in various
forms over the past fifteen years, often in response to specific
situations when pregnant women have been killed or suffered
miscarriages at the hands of third parties. Additionally, states
considering fetal homicide legislation have several choices and
can adopt proposals focusing on either the fetus or pregnant
woman as victim. Proposed statutes focusing on the fetus as
victim are prone to opposition from pro-choice advocates who
view the proposals as threats to a woman's right to choose abor-
tion. For a variety of reasons, statutes focusing on the pregnant
woman as victim are suggested as the preferred approach. Pro-
posals using this alternative focus have received less opposition
from pro-choice advocates, and, if the statutes are crafted care-
fully, will likely enjoy support from both pro-choice and anti-
abortion advocates, as well as groups concerned about the effects
of domestic violence. Although these laws would not result in
separate prosecutions for fetal deaths or injuries, they would
provide a greater level of comfort for victims' families than laws
in states that do not punish third-party harms to fetuses.
Virginia's current laws illustrate this preferred focus on the
pregnant woman as victim. With the addition of laws punishing
drunk drivers who cause miscarriages, Virginia could protect not
only pregnant women in situations such as those including do-
mestic violence, but women like Sabrina Adkinson, who, along
with their unborn children like Destiny, are helpless victims of
individuals who choose to drink and drive.
Sandra L. Smith
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